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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a failed golf course development project undertaken by Pend Oreille 
Bonner Development, Inc. ("POBD'') in Sandpoint, Idaho known as "The Idaho Club". March 16, 
2016 Trial Tr. p. 582, 1. 17 -p. 583, 1. 2. On March 9, 2006, NIR entered into a Third Amended 
and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement with Pend Oreille Bonner Investments, 
LLC ("POBI") regarding the sale of a golf comse, a clubhouse and parcels of real property. Vol. 
III, pp. 423-432. NIR did not record a purchase money mortgage against the real property sold to 
POBI, but did file a memorandum of sale giving notice of its vendor's lien. 1 
Pend Oreille Bonner Development ("POBD"), a successor to POBI, mortgaged the real 
property multiple times and ultimately defaulted on some of the mortgages. March Trial Tr. p. 
582, I. 17 -p. 583, L 2. A loan identified as Loan No. P0099 from R.E. Loans, LLC ("RE Loans"), 
a mortgage identified as Loan No. P0106 from Pensco Trust Co. Custodian FBO Barney Ng 
("Pensco") and a loan identified as Loan No. P0107 from Mortgage Fund '08 ("MF08") were 
extended to POBD. Trial Exhibits 1-3, 15-19, 21-22. Each loan was secured by a recorded 
mortgage. Id. Ultimately, these three loans were assigned to Valiant Idaho, LLC ("Valiant"). Trial 
Exhibits 75-85. 
Valiant Idaho filed a cross-claim and third-party complaint to foreclose its assigned 
mortgages against co-defendants and third-party defendants, including NIR. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-
767. This appeal involves the Court's costjudgment entered againstNIR. 
1 NIR's vendor's lien vis a vis a bona fide lender was addressed by this Court on another mortgage foreclosure 
action on a different property parcel in the Union Bank, N.A. v. N. Idaho Resorts, LLC, 161 Idaho 583, 388 P.3d 907 
(2017) decision. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Given the number of parties involved in the foreclosure proceeding, many of the pleadings 
are not relevant to this particular appeal. This course of proceedings is abbreviated to address 
those proceedings which relate to the present appeal. 
This action commenced on October 13, 2009 when one of the entities providing golf 
development services, Genesis Golf Builders, Inc., filed an action breach of contract and to 
foreclose its mechanics lien, and named multiple other parties who had either filed mechanic liens 
or mortgages against the real property. R Vol. I, pp. 172-196. Ultimately, NIR was granted a 
default judgment against Genesis Golf Builders, Inc. and its causes of action against NIR were 
dismissed with prejudice on November 1, 2013. R. Vol. III, pp. 423-432. 
Amongst the numerous defendants listed in the complaint were R.E. Loans, Pensco, and 
MF08; each of which were identified as claiming an interest in the real property. R Vol. I, pp. 172-
196. On April 2, 2011, R.E. Loans filed an answer and affirmative defenses. Vol. II, pp. 245-259. 
On August 9,2010, ACI Northwest, Inc. ("ACI") filed a counterclaim, cross claims, and a 
third-party complaint. R Vol. II, pp. 204-227. R.E. Loans was named in the cross-complaint. Id 
On February 4, 2011, R.E. Loans filed a "reply" to a cross-claim made by ACI against it. Vol. II, 
pp. 245-259. 
On September 29, 2011, the trial court stayed any action against RE Loans and MF08 
because each had filed bankruptcy. R Vol. II p.275-289. On August 24, 2012, the R.E. Loans stay 
was lifted. R Vol. II, pp. 325-329. On August 12, 2013, the MF08 stay with respect to MF08 was 
lifted. Vol. III, pp. 374-377. 
Valiant Idaho, LLC entered the litigation on July 21, 2014, when it moved to substitute in 
the place of RE Loans as the real party in interest. R. Vol. V, pp. 656-666. The basis for Valiant's 
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substitution was an assignment by RE Loans of its interest to Valiant. Id. An order was entered 
on August 7, 2014, substituting Valiant in place of RE Loans. R Vol. V, pp. 667-669. 
On August 21, 2014, Valiant filed a Counterclaim, Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint 
for Judicial Foreclosure ("Valiant's Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure"). R. Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. 
Valiant's Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure contained seven (7) causes of action. Id The first 
three were causes of action for breach of contract against POBD for breach of the loan agreements 
POBD had entered into with RE Loans, Pensco, and MF08. Id. The next three were causes of 
action for judicial foreclosure of mortgages granted to RE Loans, Pens co, and MF08 related to the 
loan agreements. Id. The seventh and final cause of action was for judicial foreclosure of a 
redemption deed for real property taxes paid by Valiant to Bonner County. Id. 
Each cause of action for judicial foreclosure asked for a determination of the rights of all 
pruties pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-1302. Valiant's prayer for relief requested the following: 
• Judgment for each breach of contract; 
• Judgment that each mortgage assigned to Valiant, and the redemption deed, be declared a 
valid and existing lien on the property for the amount prayed for; 
• A declru·ation that the interests of the Defendants are inferior to the mortgages and 
redemption deed; 
• A declaration of the priority of Valiant's and each Defendant's interest in the property, as 
well as the amounts secured by each interest; 
• Foreclosure of the m01tgages and redemption deed, with declaration that the title, claim, 
interest or demand of Defendants in and to said Idaho Club Property, and every part thereof, 
saving and excepting the right of redemption, if any, be foreclosed; 
• Sale of the property, with all its appurtenances, rights, privilege and easements; 
• Application of the proceeds of sale in a specific order; 
• Entry of a deficiency judgment; 
• An award of costs and attorney fees; and 
• Such other and further relief as deemed just and proper. 
R. Vol. VI, pp. 755-758. 
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On September 19, 2014, NIR answered Valiant's Complaint. R. Vol. VII, pp. 860-873. 
NIR's answer admitted it claimed an interest in the real property encumbered by Valiant's 
mortgages. Id. at p. 864. 
On October 6, 2014, VP, Incorporated ("VP") filed a motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 15 to 
dismiss Valiant's Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure because Valiant had not received leave of 
court to file the amended pleading, and because it was filed on behalf of two parties (MF08 and 
Pensco) for whom Valiant was not substituted as the real patty in interest. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 959-
962. Not only had R.E. Loans previously filed an answer to the complaint, it had litigated against 
other parties, including seeking summary judgment against ACI (Vol. III, pp. 438-450; Vol. IV, 
pp. 451-487) and R. C. Worst & Company, Inc. (Vol. IV, pp. 488-550). 
Thereafter, on November 5, 2014, Valiant filed a motion for leave to atnend its answer to 
allege a counterclaim, cross-claim, and serve a third-party complaint. R Vol. VIII, pp. 977-981. 
On November 19, 2014, the district court granted Valiant leave nunc pro tune to file and serve its 
third-patty complaint, and an order granting Valiant leave to atnend its answer and allege cross-
claims, thereby validating the previously filed third party complaint, counterclaims and cross 
claim. R Vol. X, pp. 1160-1167. That satne day the court entered an order denying VP's motion 
to dismiss Valiant' s Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure. R Vol. X, pp. 117 4-1177. Also on that 
satne day the district court entered orders substituting Valiant as the real patty in interest for Pensco 
andMF08. R Vol. X,pp.1168-1173. 
On January 20, 2015, Valiant filed a motion for summary judgment "that the mortgages 
assigned to Valiant by R.E. Loans, LLC, Pensco Trust Co. and Mortgage Fund '08 LLC are senior 
and superior to any and all interest claimed by [JV, NIR, and VP] in and to" the subject real 
prope1ty. R Vol. XIV, p. 1722. NIR opposed Valiant's motion for summary judgment claiming a 
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vendor's lien in the subject real prnperty with priority over Valiant's mortgages. R Vol. XXI, pp. 
2360-2368. 
On April 14, 2015, the district court entered its memorandum decision and order granting 
Valiant's motion for summary judgment. R Vol. XXII, pp. 2560-2578. The district court 
concluded that NIR's interest in a vendor's lien was subordinated to the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage 
by virtue of a March 14, 2007, Subordination Agreement. R Vol. XXII, p. 2573. That order 
declared Valiant' s interest in it mortgages and redemption deeds were "senior to any right, title 
and interest in the Idaho Club Prnperty to any claim to the Idaho Club Property by" NIR. R Vol. 
XXII, p. 2576. 
On June 16, 2015, NIR filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of the district 
comt's summary judgment memorandum decision and order. R Vol. XXII, pp. 2596-2597. NIR 
asked the district court to reconsider its decision against NIR because NIR presented sufficient 
evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding whether RE Loans had actual knowledge 
of NIR' s vendor's lien and the mistalce in the legal description attached to NIR' s partial release, 
and whether Valiant's predecessor's in interest were good faith encumbrancers. R Vol. XXIV, pp. 
2786-2788. 
On July 21, 2015, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order on NIR's 
motion to reconsider and held that NIR's vendor's lien was not valid and without force and effect 
because NIR was collaterally estopped from relitigating Judge Griffin's Union Bank decision in 
the present case .. R Vol. XXIV, pp. 2871-2873. 
A bifurcated 4-day court trial in which Valiant, Idaho, N LLC and VP, Incorporated 
participated. was conducted January 28-29, and March 16-17, 2016, to determine whether the RE 
Loans and Pensco loans were satisfied. R Vol. XXXVII, pp. 4589A590. The district court 
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determined that neither loan had been fully satisfied and Valiant was entitled to judgment against 
POBD for POBD's default on each of the three loans. R Vol. XXXVII, p. 4617. A final judgment 
and a separate decree of foreclosure were entered by the district court on July 20, 2016. R Vol. 
XLIV, p. 5317 - Vol XLV, p. 5502. 
On July 6, 2016, Valiant filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees. R Vol XLI, pp. 
5019-5057. NIR:filed an opposition to Valiant's memorandum of costs and attorney fees on July 
20, 2016. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5503-5520. On August 22, 2016, the district court entered a 
memorandum decision and order awarding costs and attorney fees to Valiant. R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 
5829-5843. In this decision, the district comt awarded $32,464.70 as discretionary costs, finding 
the litigation was complex and broad in scope. Id at 5839. The court assessed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the costs against NIR. Id. at 5841-42. On August 22, 2016, the district court entered a 
Judgement Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, including a judgment against NIR in the amount of 
$10,369.93 
NIR appealed the award of costs against it to Valiant on September 9, 2016. R Vol. IL, p. 
5941. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 9, 2006, NIR entered into a Third Amended and Restated Real Property 
Purchase and Sale Agreement with Pend Oreille Bonner Investments, LLC ("POBI") regarding 
the sale of a golf course, a clubhouse and parcels of real prope1ty. Vol. III, pp. 423-432. POBD 
mortgaged the acquired property and defaulted on its mortgages. R Vol. XXII, p. 2561. 
Valiant as the assignee of the various mortgage interests filed a Counterclaim, Cross-Claim 
and Third-Party Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure to foreclose POBD's interest in the 
encumbered real property. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. Valiant moved for summary judgment that its 
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three assigned mortgages had priority to any interest claimed by NIR and others. R Vol. XIV, p. 
1722. Valiant claimed that NIR's alleged vendor's lien interest in the real property was junior to 
its mortgages as had been adjudicated by Judge Griffin in Bonner County Case No. CV 2011-135, 
Union Bank, NA., v. Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, et al. R Vol. XIV, p. 1741. Valiant 
argued that Judge Griffin's decision in the Union Bank case acted as collateral estoppel/issue 
preclusion and was binding in the present. 
NIR opposed fue summary judgment claiming a vendor's lien on the prope1ty with priority 
over Valiant's mortgages. R Vol. XXI, pp. 2360-2368. NIR submitted that Judge Griffin's 
decision in the Union Bank case did not have a preclusive effect in the present case because NIR 
had appealed fue decision. Id. at p. 2367. Relying on Judge Griffin's decision, Judge Buchanan 
granted summary judgment against NIR. R Vol. XIV, pp. 2871-2873. 
Ultimately a bifurcated 4-day court trial was held on January 28-29, and March 16-17, 
2016, between Valiant, JV and VP to determine a single issue: whether fue RE Loans and Pensco 
loans had been satisfied. R Vol. XXXVII, pp. 4589-4590. The district comt determined that 
neither loan had been fully satisfied and Valiant was entitled to judgment against POBD for 
POBD's default on each of the three loans. R Vol. XXXVII, p. 4617. A final judgment and a 
separate decree of foreclosure were entered by the district court on July 20, 2016. R Vol. XLIV, 
p. 5317-Vol. XLV,p. 5502. 
On July 6, 2016, Valiant filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees. R Vol XLI, pp. 
5019-5057. NIR filed an opposition to Valiant's memorandum of costs and attorney fees on July 
20, 2016. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5503-5520. On August 22, 2016, the district cou1t entered a 
memorandum decision order awarding costs and attorney fees to Valiant, with a portion of costs, 
including discretionary costs, awarded against NIR. R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 5829-5843. 
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NIR appealed the judgment and decree of foreclosure entered by the district court, as well 
as the award of costs to Valiant against NIR on September 9, 2016. R Vol. IL, p. 5941. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding discretionary costs against 
NIR without finding that the costs were exceptional and should be awarded against 
NIR in the interests of justice. 
2. Did the district court err in its award against NIR of costs as a matter of right? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Comt's standard of review of an award of discretionary costs has been set forth by the 
Court as follows: 
The grant or denial of discretionary costs is "committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court," and will only be reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of 
that discretion. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 
920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 1245, 137 L.Ed.2d 
327 (1997). In considering whether the trial comt abused its discretion in ruling on 
a request for discretionaTy costs, we make a three-step inquiry: "(l) whether the 
trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its determination through an 
exercise of reason." Id. 
Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492,493,960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S A WARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
AGAINST NIR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The district comt abused its discretion in awaTding Valiant discretionary costs because the 
district court never recognized its discretion, never affirmed that it was acting within the bounds 
of its discretion, never applied the applicable legal standards, and did not reach its dete1mination 
through an exercise of reason. Therefore, the district court's award of discretionary costs should 
be set aside. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d) allows the trial court to award a prevailing party costs 
of an action.2 The rules of civil procedure categorize costs in two groups: costs as a matter of 
right, and discretionaq costs. IRCP 54( d)(l )(C) and (D). Costs as a matter of right are specifically 
enumerated and limited to those enumerated. IRCP 54( d)(l )(C). Discretionary costs are those 
"[a]dditional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of [costs as a matter of 
right]." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Discretionary costs "may be allowed on a showing that the costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) (emphasis added). 
"The burden is on the prevailing party to make an adequate initial showing that these costs 
were necessary and exceptional and reasonably incmTed, and should in the interests of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 
965, 971 (1993); Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926~ 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991); 
Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). Only after the prevailing party 
successfully meets is burden, the trial comt "must make express findings as to why the item of 
discretionary cost should or should not be allowed," after an objection by an opposing pruty. IRCP 
54(d)(l)(D). 
This Court employs the following three-step inquiry to determine if the trial comt abused 
its discretion in awru·ding discretionary costs: "(1) whether the trial comt conectly perceived the 
issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial comt reached its 
determination through an exercise of reason." Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186, 983 P.2d 834, 840 (1999). A review of the trial court's 
2 Appellant NIR makes no challenge on appeal to the district court's prevailing party determination. 
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memorandum decision and order awarding discretionary costs against NIR reveals that the award 
was an abuse of discretion. 
1. The District Court did not Perceive its Award of Discretionary Costs as a 
Matter of Discretion 
The district court's decision never affamed or mentioned that it was exercising its 
discretion in awarding Valiant discretionary costs. Indeed, the district court's only use of the 
term "discretionary" was in the context of the te1m "discretionary costs" as used in IRCP 
54( d)(l )(D). R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 583 8-5842. Thus, the district court failed to perceive the issue 
as one of discretion. 
2. The District Court did not Act within the Boundaries of its Discretion or 
Consistent with Applicable Legal Standards 
The district court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion because it awarded 
discretionary costs despite Valiant' s failure to make a showing that the costs were exceptional and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against NIR. The district court's award is also 
inconsistent with Idaho's case law. 
Rule 54(d)(l)(D) limits the court's ability to award discretionary costs to instances where 
the movant or requesting party makes a "showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) does not define what it 
means for a cost to be "exceptional." 
This Court has held the trial court "may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the 
context of the nature of the case." Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347,354,256 P.3d 755, 762 
(2011). Idaho case law has developed a consistent definition of an exceptional cost: An 
exceptional cost is one that is uncommon in the particular type of case, or that arises from a case 
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that itself is exceptional. The second standard, or the "exceptional case standard," was set forth in 
Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168 (2005), as follows: 
"This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be 'exceptional' under I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional." 
The first standard, uncommon costs in a particular type of case, has been upheld by this 
Court on numerous occasions. For instance, this Court has held "[ c ]ertain cases, such as personal 
injury, [sic] cases generally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that these costs are 
considered ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)." Hayden Lake Fire 
Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). 
The standard that an exceptional cost must be uncommon for the type of case was upheld 
by this Court in the Fish v. Smith case as follows: 
Fish contends that the trial comi abused its discretion because it failed to define 
"exceptional." In fact, by its reasoning in ruling that the requested costs were not 
exceptional, the trial court did give meaning to this word. The trial court pointed 
out that "expert witnesses-medical; neuropsychological; accident reconstruction; 
vocational; and so forth-routinely testify in serious personal injury actions," and 
that "[t]he vast majority of litigated personal injury cases ... routinely require an 
assessment of the accident and the alleged injuries by various sorts of doctors of 
medicine, accident reconstructionists, vocational experts and so on." The trial court 
concluded: "This is the very 'natme' of these sorts of cases. Similarly, travel and 
lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys and photocopy expenses are 
not exceptional but, on the contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature."' This 
demonstrates the trial court's understanding of the meaning of "exceptional" as 
contained in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-94, 960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998). 
This Court upheld a similar trial court ruling in Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 
P.2d 148, 155 (1999), where the basis of the denial of the discretionary costs award was the 
common nature of the costs requested for the type of case at issue: 
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The trial court stated that "[s]ixMfigure cases involving substantial discovery, 
substantial copying charges, and expert witnesses who charge more than $500.00 
no longer are unusual or extraordinary. For the most part the claimed discretionary 
costs were routine costs associated with modem litigation overhead.,, The trial 
court's express finding that the discretionary costs were reasonable and necessary 
but not exceptional after identifying the general nature of the discretionary costs 
satisfied the requirement that it make express findings. · 
Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,384,973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999). 
This Court has held that a district court abused its discretion in awarding expert witness 
fees in a medical malpractice action simply because the expert testimony was necessaq to the 
nature of the case: 
Here, the only reason given by the district court to award expert witness fees as a 
discretionary cost is that the case required expe1ts on the vascular system to travel 
and testify. Expert witness testimony is required in every malpractice case, LC. § 
6-1012, thus the district court seems to have concluded that the expert witness 
fees were exceptional simply due to the case being one for medical malpractice. 
Absent other findings, there is no basis for every expert witness' testimony to be 
considered "exceptional" simply because it requires specialized knowledge. Fish v. 
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-94, 960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998) (not an abuse of 
discretion to find that the cost of hiring experts on accident reconstruction and 
medical diagnosis is routine and not exceptional in personal injury cases). That 
specialized knowledge and expert testimony is exactly the type of "ordinary" 
cost of both proving and defending a medicalMmalpractice claim. The fact that 
"[t]hese physicians were required to understand the local standard of health care 
practice and to have knowledge and understanding of causation as it related to 
damages" does not provide any basis as to why the costs are "exceptional" for a 
medical malpractice case. Because the district court did not provide sufficient 
findings under Rule 54( d)(l )(D) for why these costs are exceptional we find that it 
abused its discretion. The award of $10,730 in expert witness fees for Dr. 
Moorhead, $8625 for Dr. Huang, and $829 for Dr. Barros-Bailey is vacated. 
Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354-55, 256 P.3d 755, 762-63 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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Eighteen (18) years ago Justice Silak, in a dissenting opinion, challenged a district court's 
award of discretionary costs for attorney air travel to out-of-state depositions because of the 
conunon nature of the costs of air travel in modem litigation: 
I am especially troubled by the district court's award of airfare to DeBest. An 
attorney might be required to travel to attend a deposition in almost any case. 
Considering the lengthy nature of civil litigation and the mobility of post-modem 
society, attorneys are often required to purchase plane tickets to attend out-of-state 
depositions. If a party is entitled to travel expenses of such an ordinary and 
mundane nature, it is difficult to say what could not be awal'ded as an "exceptional" 
discretionary cost. 
Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. De Best Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 188, 983 P.2d 834, 
842 (1999) (Silak, J. & Trout, C.J., dissenting). With the continued proliferation of air travel in 
the last two decades it is puzzling for airfare and travel costs to be characterized as exceptional for 
purposes of an award of discretionary costs awarded by a trial court. 
According to Idaho's case law on the issue, if an expense is ordinary and conunon to the 
type of action before the trial court, it is an abuse of discretion to make a discretionary cost award 
for that cost. 
i. Valiant Failed to Carry its Burden to Show Exceptional Costs and 
Justice in Awarding Those Costs Against NIR 
In this case, there was no evidence presented to the district court that any of the 
discretionary costs requested by Valiant were exceptional or unconunon in a conunercial 
foreclosure action of this magnitude. Valiant also failed to address why justice would require the 
discretionary costs be taxed against NIR as opposed to any of the other parties to the action, such 
as POBD. Initially Valiant simply alleged its requested discretionary costs were necessary and 
exceptional without providing any reason why the costs were "exceptional." R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-
5055. Valiant never alleged that any of its claimed discretionary costs were exceptional or that its 
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case was exceptional. Id. The nearest Valiant approached to arguing that the costs were 
exceptional was to claim that the litigation in this case was complex. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5055. 
However, Valiant provided no support for its contention that complexity of an action renders all 
its associated costs exceptional and uncommon. In fact, as this Court acknowledged in Fish, some 
cases are complex from the very nature of the case, and such complexity is expected. 
In reply to NIR' s objection to Valiant' s requested discretionary costs, Valiant admitted that 
the only reason it believed the discretionary costs it requested were exceptional was because it 
believed NIR acted frivolously throughout the action, making the action itself exceptional: 
As discussed, NIR and VP's defense of this lawsuit was frivolous. As such, all of 
the discretionary costs for which Valiant seeks recovery in the Valiant foreclosure 
action ( other than the litigation guarantee) should be deemed exceptional. It is the 
exceptional case in which a party acts fiivolously. Therefore, once the Court finds 
that NIR and VP defended this case frivolously, it follows that all the costs incu1Ted 
because of those frivolous defenses are exceptional and recoverable as 
discretionary costs. 
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. The trial com! rejected Valiant's argument that NIR, VP and JV had 
defended their positions frivolously. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5835-5837. No appeal was made from 
the trial court's fmding. Valiant failed to present any other argument why these costs were 
uncommon or exceptional. 
Tlll'Iling to the specific costs, Valiant requested an award for its litigation guarantee dost. 
Valiant completely failed to show that this cost was exceptional in a mortgage foreclosure action, 
and in the interest of justice should be assessed against NIR. Indeed, Valiant aclmowledged that 
the cost for a litigation guarantee has no relationship to the "frivolous" actions of the defendants. 
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. Litigation guarantees are a common expense for a judicial foreclosure. 
As such, it should not have been awarded as an exceptional cost. 
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Valiant also failed to meet its burden to establish that any of its other requested 
discretionary costs should in the interest of justice be assessed against NIR. Valiant never set forth 
any reasons why justice would require NIR be taxed with an award of discretionary costs, other 
than its argument that NIR acted frivolously. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-55; R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. 
As noted above, the district court disagreed with Valiant that NIR acted frivolously. 
In fact, many of the costs were incurred after summary judgment was granted against NIR. 
NIR did not participate at trial because summary judgment had already been granted against it. 
Thus, the witness fees, exhibit costs, electronic discovery costs, in-house photocopying expenses, 
out-sourced photocopy expenses and travel expenses for counsel unrelated to NIR' s summary 
judgment would not relate to NIR and should not have been awarded against it. 
Even if such· costs were incun-ed while NIR was still a party, the trial court failed to 
determine a basis for fmding they were exceptional. In Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 901, 367 
P.3d 1214, 1229 (2015), this Court reiterated "[i]n Hoagland [v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900,303 
P.3d 587 (2013)], this Comt set forth factors a district court should consider when determining 
whether costs are exceptional: 'whether there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there 
was an unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary 
cost that could have been easily avoided. Most importantly, however, a court should explain why 
the circU111stances of a case render it exceptional.' Id.- ( emphasis in original)." 
The district court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion when it awarded 
discretiornuy costs to Valiant. Valiant made no showing under IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) that the 
discretionary costs it sought were exceptional and in the interest of justice should be assessed 
against NIR. More importantly, the district court made no finding why it considered the 
discretionary costs requested by Valiant to be exceptional costs. 
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ii. The District Court Did Not Act Within the Boundaries of its 
Discretion or Consistent with Applicable Legal Standards 
The district court also abused its discretion by awarding discretionary costs inconsistent 
with the applicable legal standards. The distTict court's stated rationale for awarding the 
discretionary costs highlights the inconsistency of the award with Idaho law. Simply put, the 
district court awarded Valiant discretionary costs because they were not available as costs as a 
matter ofright and were costs necessarily incun·ed by Valiant: 
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary 
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice, 
because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter 
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a 
matter of right." 
R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839-40. The district comt's reasoning is incongrnent: the discretionary costs 
were necessary litigation costs, but not compensable as costs as a matter of right. Therefore, they 
can be awarded as discretionary costs. 
This is the same abuse of discretion recognized in the Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 
347, 354-55, 256 P.3d 755, 762-63 (2011), where this Comt held that the necessity of a cost does 
not equate to its exceptional nature. Indeed, the disttict court's reasoning fails to recognize the 
applicable legal standards for an award of discretionary costs because it never malces any findings 
that any of the costs are uncommon in a commercial m01tgage foreclosure action. 
Looking to the discretionary costs awarded by the district court, it is apparent that the costs, 
while perhaps necessary and reasonably incmred, are all common in a commercial foreclosure 
action. Addressing the litigation guarantee first, there was no showing made, nor facts to support 
a conclusion, that the cost of a litigation guarantee in this commercial foreclosure action was 
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uncommon. Recently in a special concurring opinion, Justice Jim Jones mentioned that obtaining 
a litigation guarantee in aid of commercial foreclosure is common and an exercise of due diligence: 
ACI did due diligence by obtaining a litigation guaranty prior to commencing its 
foreclosure action and naming as parties those who were listed in the litigation 
guaranty. The result here is harsh from ACI's standpoint but it may have some 
recourse through its litigation guaranty. 
Sims v. ACI Northwest., Inc., 157 Idaho 906,342 P.3d 618, 627 (2015) (J. Jones, J., concurring). 
Indeed, in a related case this Court encouraged the use of a litigation guarantee to ensure proper 
parties are named in a foreclosure action: "Further, Sims1s confusion could have been cleared up 
had he taken the simple step of obtaining a title repmt or litigation guaranty from a title company." 
Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907,914 (2015). The Appellant submits to this Court 
that litigation guarantees are common place in all types of foreclosure actions, including mortgage 
foreclosure actions, and especially when the commercial mortgages encumber multiple parcels of 
real property. 
The district court never made any specific· finding that the litigation guarantee cost was 
exceptional or uncommon. To the contrary, the district court only reasoned that the cost of a 
litigation guarantee was necessaiy: 
In order to ensure that every person or entity with an interest in the Idaho Club 
Property was names as a defendant in the Valiant Foreclosure, Valiant obtained and 
paid for a Litigation Guarantee. This Litigation Guai·antee was critical to the 
foreclosure action. 
R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5840. Necessai-y and reasonably incurred are not the same standard as 
"exceptional." To support a finding that the cost of the litigation guai·antee was exceptional, the 
district court was required to find that the cost was uncommon in a commercial mortgage 
foreclosure action. The district court failed to make that finding and thus, abused its discretion in 
awarding Valiant the cost of the litigation guarantee as a discretionary cost. 
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Each of the other discretionary costs awarded by tbe district court suffers from the same 
flaw: none are supported by findings tbat tbe costs were uncommon in a commercial mmtgage 
foreclosme action. Indeed, each of the "discretionary costs" awarded by the district couit can be 
described as "routine costs associated with modern litigation overhead," rather tban exceptional 
costs. See City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 589, 130 P.3d 1118, 1127 (2006) (trial court 
did not abuse discretion in denying claim for discretionary costs when costs were routine). 
The district court never made a finding that the costs of travel for Valiant' s counsel was uncommon 
or exceptional, only that tbe travel costs were necessary and significant. R Vol. XL VIII, p. 5840. 
As Justice Silak stated almost two decades ago, costs for travel are "ordinary and mundane" and 
not exceptional. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho at 88, 983 P .2d at 842 (Silak, J. & Trout, C.J .. , 
dissenting). 
Each of the remaining discretionary costs awarded by the district court are also "routine 
costs associated witb modern litigation overhead" and so "ordinary and mundane" that tbey should 
not qualify as exceptional or uncommon costs. All litigation includes expenses for copying and 
scanning pleadings, correspondence, and other case related documents. Every litigation includes 
costs of propounding and processing discovery. Every litigation includes costs for postage and 
comier services. Every litigation involves costs for telephone calls and conferences. Litigation 
with trial witnesses almost always includes costs of witnesses exceeding tbe meager $20 allowable 
as a matter of right. While the district court in some instances found tbat tbe costs Valiant incmred 
were necessary, it failed to make any findings that the costs were uncommon for this type of 
litigation. R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 5840-41. Instead the district court included conclusory "magic 
words" stating that each category of costs was "necessary and exceptional, reasonably incuned, 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the defendants." R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 5840-
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41. Such conclusory "findings" do not satisfy the requirements ofIRCP 54( d)(l)(D), nor the case 
law interpreting and applying that rule. 
The district court also completely failed to address how any of the awarded discretionary 
costs should in the interest of justice be assessed against NIR, as opposed to any of the other 
defendants in the action. This failure is most evident with the award of costs for the litigation 
guarantee. The cost of the litigation guarantee was incurred before NIR was even made a paity to 
the action. Indeed, the entire purpose of ordering the litigation guarantee was to determine "every 
person or entity with an interest in the Idaho Club Property" so each identified paiiy could be 
"named as a defendant in the Valiant Foreclosure." R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5840. The only party that 
had any responsibility and fault for the foreclosure action was POBD, the party who defaulted on 
its m01igage payments. Surprisingly, the district comi never even considered assessing the cost 
of the litigation guarantee against POBD. It likewise never addressed why NIR should be 
responsible for such a cost. The saine is true for each of the other discretionary costs awarded, the 
district comi never addressed why the interests of justice would require the costs to be awarded 
against NIR. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding the discretionary costs 
against NIR because it never considered whether an award against NIR, or alternatively against 
one of the other parties, satisfied the interests of justice. 
3. The District Court did not Reach its Determination through an Exercise of 
Reason 
The district comi abused its discretion in awarding Valiant discretionary costs against NIR 
because its award was not reached through an exercise of reason. As set forth above, the district 
comi' s reason for awarding Valiant discretionary costs was that the costs were necessary and not 
otherwise compensable as costs as a matter of right. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839-40. 
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Perhaps the best example of the lack of reason in the district court's award of discretionary 
costs is the award for the litigation guarantee and the apportionment ratios chosen by the district 
court. As set forth above, there is absolutely no reason why NIR should be taxed with the costs of 
a litigation guarantee. Assuming arguendo that the litigation guarantee is an exceptional cost, there 
is no reason why any party other than POBD should be taxed with that cost. Thus, the district 
court did not reach its determination through an act of reason. 
Similarly, the district court's apportioning ratios of the discretionary costs lack a reasonable 
method of determination and was not authorized by Rule 54. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l )(B) only allows the trial court to apportion costs awarded between the parties when it finds 
that a party only partially prevailed: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which paity to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action prevailed in 
part and did not prevail iu part, and on so finding may apportiou the costs 
between aud among the parties in a fair and equitable mauner after considering 
all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment or 
judgments obtained. 
IRCP 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis added). The plain language of the mle limits the comt's ability to 
appmtion costs between paities to situations where the comt determines "a paity to an action 
prevailed in pait and did not prevail in pait." Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d 
1313, 1318 (Ct. App. 1989) (Rule 54(d)(l) gives a trial judge discretionary authority to apportion 
costs if both paities prevail). The district court in this case never decided there was a paity that 
prevailed in pait and did not prevail in pait. To the contrary, the district court unequivocally 
determined that Valiant was the prevailing party in the action. R Vol. XL VIII p. 5831. Thus, the 
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district court's allocation of costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l)(B) was an abuse of discretion and 
unsuppmted by the rules of civil procedure. 
The standard by which the district court should have based its award of discretionary costs 
against the va:tious patties is IRCP 54( d)(l )(D) where an assessment of costs is limited to those 
that "should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse patty." As set forth above, 
the district court completely failed to satisfy this standard in its discretionary costs award. 
Rather than addressing what paities in the interest of justice should be taxed with 
discretionary costs, the district court awarded those costs against NIR, VP, and JV according to a 
ratio that it created with no explanation. R Vol. XLVIII p. 5841. The ratio appears to account for 
the fact that NIR was dismissed at summary judgment and patticipated in the case less than VP 
and JV, who, according to the ratios given, had an equal involvement in the case. Id. The lack of 
explanation for how these ratios were derived and the lack of equating these ratios to specific acts 
of the patties and any correlation to any of the specific discretionary costs awarded evidences that 
this "appmtionment" was not created by an exercise of reason and does not satisfy the interests of 
justice. There is no reason or justice in taxing NIR 25% of the cost of a litigation guarantee that 
was obtained before NIR had even appeared in the case. IfNIR had simply allowed Valiant to 
take a default judgment against it in this case, that cost would not have been avoided. There is no 
reason or justice to tax NIR 25% of the travel costs of Valiant, when Valiant chose to engage 
attorneys in Boise rather than attorneys closer to the subject propetty and venue of the action. 
There is no reason or justice in taxing NIR 25% of the ordinary and mundane litigation costs 
incurred by Valiant in this case. 
NIR' s actions in this case bear no responsibility for the cost of the litigation guarantee. 
NIR' s actions bear no responsibility for the ordinary and mundane litigation costs that Valiant 
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inc1med in this action. Most importantly, the district court failed to make any reasoned finding 
that any of these costs were the result of actions ofNIR and that justice requires NIR be taxed with 
these costs. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding discretionary costs 
againstNIR. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF CERTAIN COSTS AS A 
MATTER OF RIGHT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Costs as a matter of right are awarded pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C). The district court 
awarded Valiant their entire filing fees as a matter of right. However, the only filing fee that 
related to NIR was the $14,00 fee for filing Valianfs Third Patty Complaint against NIR. As to 
witness fees, NIR was no longer a party when the depositions of Linscott and Ng were taken. 
Regarding certified copies for use at trial, NIR did not pmticipate at trial. The same is trne 
regarding charges for reporting and transcribing depositions of trial witnesses. These were taken 
after summm·y judgment was granted against NIR. Thus, the trial court's allocation of twenty~five 
percent of these costs as a matter of right incurred after summary judgement was granted against 
NIR was an abuse of discretion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the trial court's award of discretionary costs and costs 
as a matter of rights against NIR should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of November, 2017. 
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